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Abstract—Detecting misbehavior (such as transmissions of false
information) in vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) is very
important problem with wide range of implications including
safety related and congestion avoidance applications. We discuss
several limitations of existing misbehavior detection schemes
(MDS) designed for VANETs. Most MDS are concerned with
detection of malicious nodes. In most situations, vehicles would
send wrong information because of selfish reasons of their owners,
e.g. for gaining access to a particular lane. Because of this (rational
behavior), it is more important to detect false information than
to identify misbehaving nodes. We introduce the concept of data-
centric misbehavior detection and propose algorithms which detect
false alert messages and misbehaving nodes by observing their
actions after sending out the alert messages. With the data-
centric MDS, each node can independently decide whether an
information received is correct or false. The decision is based on
the consistency of recent messages and new alert with reported
and estimated vehicle positions. No voting or majority decisions
is needed, making our MDS resilient to Sybil attacks. Instead of
revoking all the secret credentials of misbehaving nodes, as done in
most schemes, we impose fines on misbehaving nodes (administered
by the certification authority), discouraging them to act selfishly.
This reduces the computation and communication costs involved
in revoking all the secret credentials of misbehaving nodes.
Keywords: Misbehavior detection, Location privacy, Selfish
behavior
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) consists of vehicles (also
referred to as nodes), road side units (RSUs) and certification
authorities (CAs), whose goal is to ensure road safety and help
in secure transfer of message and data. Communication can
either be vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) (e.g. relaying alert informa-
tion) or vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) (e.g. when the vehicle
needs to report some event to the CA). Security in VANETs is
important, because the message sent by one vehicle might have
important consequences such as accident prevention.
VANETs are a class of ephemeral networks [28], where the
connection between vehicles (nodes) is very short lived. The
network topology changes very frequently, as nodes move in
and out of range of each other. The density of the network also
changes over time, e.g. during rush hours. These characteristics
make VANET very challenging for dealing with security issues.
Each vehicle has an on board unit (OBU), which broadcasts
messages about the position, speed, acceleration/deceleration,
alert signals etc. OBU also has authentication capabilities, to
verify that an incoming message has been broadcasted by a
valid entity. Roadside units (RSUs) help in coordinating vehicle
activities and collect information about nearby vehicles and their
actions (e.g. red light violations). Human behavioral tendencies
will be reflected in the movement of the vehicles (rational be-
havior). Vehicles (faulty nodes) can either start malfunctioning
due to some internal failures and give out false alerts, false
location and speed intentionally for selfish reasons. Malicious
vehicles may also attempt to gather sensitive information about
other users e.g. credit card number while interpreting RFID
signals at an electronic toll station.
To protect its privacy, each node does not use its unique iden-
tity (for example, the electronic license plate), but pseudonyms,
when broadcasting data. Pseudonyms are generated and as-
signed in such a way that a node’s unique identity cannot be
derived by observing two or more pseudonyms. Users can also
authenticate themselves using pseudonyms.
Current research on security in VANETs has been focussed
on location privacy, maintaining authenticity of data and re-
vocation of certificates and secret credentials. Surveys on the
security challenges in VANETs can be found in [23], [19],
[26], [4]. Most papers on location privacy deal with how to
assign pseudonyms [28], when to change pseudonyms [28],
[34], [11], [6], and how to assign signatures using pseudonyms
[37]. Authentication techniques rely on signatures, such that a
message is signed with a private key which can be verified if
a user has the corresponding public key. A certificate is also
issued which verifies the validity of the public key. Signature
schemes for VANETs have been studied extensively, e.g. ECMV
[38] and PASS [37]. Revocation of malicious nodes is another
issue that has received a lot of attention. The issues are whether
to maintain a list of all revoked certificates and keys or revoked
vehicles or some seed of the revoked vehicles [37]. Revocation
of certificates and secret credentials has the following disadvan-
tages. The certificate revocation list (CRL) containing all the
certificates of revoked vehicles, has to be sent to all the nodes
in the network. This approach requires a huge bandwidth, if the
number of revoked nodes is high. Next, revocation may not be
necessary if a vehicle misbehaved only once for some selfish
reason.
In this paper we assume that nodes misbehave mostly because
of selfish reasons, to reach their destinations faster. For example,
vehicle might send false report on congestion, accident or road
block. It is conceivable to believe that a vehicle does not
have malicious intentions of causing accidents. Each vehicle
normally sends valid and useful information. If all the certifi-
cates are revoked then useful information sent will be ignored.
Therefore we argue that we do not need to classify vehicles
according to their overall behavior, but instead to distinguish
between correct and false information received from a vehicle.
For example, how to verify the report about an approaching
vehicle (possible emergency vehicle)? Therefore, it is important
to identify false data and the sender efficiently, because a
delay of even one second might cause traffic accident. This
problem is termed as data-centric misbehavior detection in
contrast to entity-centric misbehavior detection, where the main
goal is to find out and penalize a misbehaving node. The idea
of data-centric misbehavior detection stems from Raya’s work
[28] on data-centric trust, where the author considers trust on
information rather than on the source of information. In our
approach, we do not revoke nodes which misbehave. Instead,
the misbehaving node receives a fine, depending upon its action.
It can keep on sending information which might not necessarily
be malicious. The payment of fines would hopefully discourage
nodes from sending further false messages.
We will concentrate on detecting false alert messages and
false location information sent out by a node. We would like to
detect alerts like emergency breaking, approaching emergency
vehicles, road feature notifications, change of lanes etc. A list
of such alerts is given in Section IV-A.
Intrusion detection has been studied extensively in the context
of wireless ad hoc networks. However the existing solution
approaches are not applicable for detecting malicious behavior
in VANETs. In Section II-B we will discuss intrusion detection
schemes used for other ad hoc networks and explain why they
cannot be applied to VANETs. In a nutshell, the detection
itself is application and scenario dependent. Trust management
based solutions are not feasible here because neighborhood
may change rapidly and therefore trust relationships could be
short lived and difficult to even establish in the first place. In
relatively static neighborhood graphs (e.g. in congested areas)
neighbors may not have history of misbehavior so the first
violation cannot be automatically detected. Central authority
may not be available to facilitate misbehavior detection and
penalize accordingly.
The first existing solution to misbehavior detection problem
in VANETs, by Golle et al [16], creates a model of the network.
The model of the network is the set of all possible events in the
network. An event which is observed by another node is checked
with the model. If it is valid, according to the model, then
it is considered to be a correct message, otherwise false. The
main problem with this approach is that it has not been shown
how this model can be created and maintained. For VANETs,
which consists of several nodes, building up a global database
(as pointed out in [16]) can be very expensive and impractical.
Another problem is that the scheme does not provide location
privacy, which our scheme achieves using pseudonyms.
Some solutions [42], [25] are based on countering Sybil
attacks [10] in VANETs. The schemes assume that the precise
location of nodes are known. Moreover, these scheme cannot
detect false alerts raised by nodes. In Sybil attacks nodes pose
as separate identities and influence the decision of revocation
and MDS, which rely on majority votes. Since our scheme takes
into account individual decisions, Sybil attacks poses no threat
to the network.
Ghosh et al [14] investigated post crash scenarios. They
compared the expected and actual trajectory to decide if a node
is sending the correct post crash notification (PCN) alert. The
expected trajectory has been modelled using node’s possible
behavior. For example a lazy node might not take any action
until it is very close to the site of crash. On the other hand a risk-
averse node might move away very far from the site of crash.
There are three aspects to be noted: the modelling of expected
trajectory, the reported position of the node and the actual
position of the node. There are two major drawbacks in their
scheme. Firstly, they assume that a malicious node always sends
its correct location information. This is not a valid assumption,
because the nodes might send wrong location information and
compel other nodes to believe that their trajectory is what
is expected. Even a small change in position can make a
huge difference, for example lane change. Secondly, the actual
trajectory may indeed legitimately differ from the one predicted
by modeling the movement. For example a car might turn right
at a crossing or prepare for left turn and change the lane. These
have not been considered by Ghosh et al [14].
In this paper we propose techniques to detect misbehaving
nodes and incorrect data, which will also preserve the privacy
of the network. Vehicles sent periodic beacon messages, so
that the positions of neighbors is monitored over time. Our
method borrows some ideas form [14]. If reported position is not
consistent with the alert raised then the receiving node declares
the message as incorrect and discards it. Consider the situation
in Fig I. At time t1 node nj (with pseudonym pjt1 ) sends an
alert that “Road block at location X” (Fig 1(a)) At time t2
(t1 close to t2) its position is past X (Fig 1(a)). This suggests
that either there is no road block at location X, or location
information of nj is wrong. It might do so, to divert the traffic
to another lane, to gain easy access of lane X.
We address more general types of reported information
compared to [14]. Nodes can send any kind of information,
either different alerts or lane changing information. The other
cars should be able to verify the validity of the message content
from the subsequent location information. We also address
the problem of verifying the validity of location information
reported by neighbors. If wrong information is detected, the
CA is contacted via the nearest RSU. CA knows the mapping
of the pseudonym to the actual node ID of the misbehaving
node.
Convicted vehicle is not revoked. Instead, CA imposes a fine
on it. Since the nodes change their pseudonyms on a regular
basis, it might not be possible to link the alert message sent and
the location information as coming from the same vehicle. We
therefore impose the restriction on the lifetime of pseudonyms.
There should be a certain time interval after sending an alert
message, before the pseudonym can be changed.
(a) Node nj sends alert “Road block at location X”
(b) Node nj goes past the location X
Fig. 1. Example: inconsistencies in messages prove misbehavior
A. Our contribution
1) We propose a new model of VANET where we as-
sume that most misbehaviors arise out of selfish motives.
However, our model can also handle misbehavior from
malicious nodes.
2) We do not revoke misbehaving nodes, but impose fines on
them. This reduces the communication and computation
costs in calculating, transmitting, and storing certificate
revocation lists.
3) Misbehavior is detected by observing alerts raised by a
node and its subsequent action.
4) Our approach does not rely on voting schemes and group
associations. Therefore it is immune to Sybil attacks.
5) False location information can be detected in addition to
detecting false alert messages.
B. Organization
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we present
related work on VANET security. We discuss the limitations of
existing MDS in VANETs in Section III. Our network model,
definitions and notations are presented in Section IV. We present
our misbehavior detection scheme in Section V. We discuss the
limitations of our scheme in Section VII and conclude in Section
VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section we discuss security and privacy issues in
VANETs. We then discuss existing intrusion detection schemes
in general ad hoc networks and explain why the are not a good
option for misbehavior detection in VANETs.
A. Security and privacy in VANETs
Security and privacy in VANETs involve the following
important issues: authentication, location privacy, misbehavior
detection and revocation. Amongst these authentication, location
privacy and revocation has received a lot of attention. In this
section we give a brief overview of the existing work on these
three issues.
Authentication is done using two techniques: 1) group sig-
nature schemes and 2) pseudonyms. Pseudonyms also help in
privacy protection. In a signature scheme, each user is given a
private key, with which it signs the message.
Each user can construct the public keys of all the users.
When another user receives the signed message, it can verify
the signature and check the authenticity of the message. Group
signatures were introduced by Chaum and van Heyst [8] to
provide anonymity to the signers.
Boneh et al [5] suggested the use of group signatures in vehic-
ular networks. Group signatures [34], [7], [36] can be applied to
sign message in VANETs, so that, when another vehicle receives
the message, it can only check the authenticity of the message,
with no means to track the node who sent it. Although these
schemes provide authentication, conditional anonymity and non-
repudiation, they result in large revocation costs. Since groups
can change very frequently in a city network, this scheme is
not so practical.
The existence of a single identity poses a great threat to the
privacy of a user. A user’s movement can be easily tracked. It
is also possible to trace the personal details of the user. For
this reason each vehicle is given a set of aliases which are
called pseudonyms and a unique identity. The unique identity
is known only to the user and a certified authority which
issues the pseudonyms. Any other node or RSU only knows
the pseudonym.
The pseudonyms are generated in a way that the identity of
the node cannot be obtained from the pseudonyms. A vehicle
can also have multiple public/private key pairs, corresponding
to each pseudonym. This concept of
pseudonyms was introduced by Hubaux et al [17] and has
gained a lot of attention. Pseudonyms were used in authentica-
tion in [29]. Calandriello et al [7] used a hybrid scheme using
pseudonyms and group signatures for authentication.
Pseudonyms are changed from time to time to preserve loca-
tion privacy. In [12], the authors point out that the pseudonyms
should be changed only in the mix zones. Mix zones are areas
where nodes cannot be observed, either by another node or by
a RSU. The problem with this approach is that if there is only
one node in a mix-zone and it changes its pseudonym, then
it is clear that the two pseudonyms belong to the same node.
However, if there are more than one vehicle in the mix zone and
they change their pseudonym, then it cannot be easily predicted
which pseudonym corresponds to which node. Buttyan et al [6]
show by simulation, how the privacy level is changed using the
above approach. Frequent change of pseudonyms ensure higher
privacy, but pseudonyms are expensive and often obtained from
a central authority.
Freudiger et al [11] give a detailed study about the age of
pseudonyms and discussed different parameters, on which the
age of pseudonym depends. Sampigethaya et al [33], [34] used
random silent period between the change of pseudonyms. They
assumed that vehicles move in a group with similar speed. When
a new vehicle joins the network with some pseudonym, it waits
for a random time before changing its pseudonym. For example,
if two nodes enter the network at the same time and change their
pseudonym after a random time interval, then the new and old
pseudonyms of a vehicle cannot be linked.
Another area of vehicular network security which has re-
ceived a lot of attention is revocation of nodes. Most of the work
in this area assumes that there is an underlying misbehavior
detection mechanism, that has detected the misbehaving nodes.
Revocation can either be local or global.
In [31], the authors present a local revocation scheme using
LEAVE protocol. The misbehaving node is revoked from the
neighborhood, generally by voting. Moore et al [22] used a
“suicide” mechanism called sting, in which revocation is done
locally. A node accusing a misbehaving node is also blacklisted
by the neighboring nodes, along with the accused node.
This sacrificing behavior demonstrates that the first node is
honest. This scheme can be attacked in the following way: Con-
sider the situation in which there is a benign node surrounded by
misbehaving nodes. Once honest node issues accusation signal,
it is revoked and cannot accuse the other misbehaving nodes.
Also, if one of the misbehaving nodes accuses a honest node and
is revoked, the other malicious nodes still remain in the network.
A misbehaving node might accuse another misbehaving node
and be considered honest by other nodes.
Two game theoretic based revocation schemes [30], [3] have
been proposed. Nodes can either vote, abstain for voting or
commit “suicide”. Each of these actions have associated pay-
off and costs. Nodes choose the action that maximizes their
benefits. A recent work by Liu et al [21] show the limitations
on revocation in VANETs using the game theoretic approach.
The above papers assume that the number of neighbors is known
which is not the case for VANETs. The CA decides the costs
and pay-offs and might not be available all the time.
Revocation of nodes means revocation of their certificates.
However, the use of pseudonyms imply that the malicious
node’s certificates must all be revoked. This increases the size
of the certification revocation list (CRL). In [20], [24], the CRL
is transmitted from vehicle to vehicle and is therefore require
significant communication overhead. Recently, Sun et al [37]
proposed an authentication scheme in which the CRL size is of
the order of the revoked vehicles and does not depend on the
number of pseudonyms that the revoked vehicles have.
B. Intrusion detection schemes in ad hoc networks
There has been several intrusion detection schemes for ad hoc
networks. A survey can be found in [1]. In some schemes like
SCAN [27], [40] neighboring nodes monitor a given node. If
the number of votes against the node exceeds a threshold, then
the node is evicted. This will not work for VANETs because
of the ephemeral nature of the network, there might not be
enough nodes in the vicinity of a malicious node to revoke
it. Alert based schemes [13], [41] raise an alert either to the
base station or other nodes, if abnormal behavior is observed.
Malicious nodes might raise false alerts against benign nodes
and jeopardize the situation. Base stations might not be within
communication range to analyze the observed behavior. If there
are too many malicious nodes in the vicinity of a benign
node, they might falsely accuse it, but collectively raising alerts
against it. Clulow and Moore’s [9] uses a suicide scheme where
a node which convicts another node has to sacrifice one of its
certificates. The whole idea of suicide will deter a malicious
node to accuse a benign node. They use a game theoretic
approach. Reidt et al [32] adds the concept of karmic-suicide
which gives incentives to nodes which commit suicide and
includes them in the network again. Game theoretic techniques
cannot be used as is, in misbehavior detection in VANETs,
because in an ephemeral network, costs and benefits will change
over time and vary from node to node. Two questions that need
to be answered are who decides these costs and benefits and
how these costs and benefits change in the network.
III. LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING MISBEHAVIOR DETECTION
SCHEMES IN VANETS
In this section, we discuss various MDS in VANETs. We
point out their limitations, which motivated us to design a new
misbehavior detection scheme.
The first paper on misbehavior detection in VANETs was
by Golle et al [16]. The paper proposes an approach to detect
malicious data based on its deviation from an existing model of
the network. They adopt a parsimony argument which assumes
that an attack involving a few malicious node is more likely to
happen than a collusion attack consisting of a large number of
nodes. Each event has an associated location information. Nodes
observe different events and store them in a global database. The
model of the VANET lists the set of all possible events.
First, maintaining a global database of events might not be
easy for VANETs because of the large network size. A global
database cannot be maintained by the nodes and maintaining
it with a trusted authority might make it time consuming to
compare the results with the observed values. Even if only
the local information is maintained in the database, it has to
be changed from time to time as nodes enter and leave the
neighborhood. Maintaining such a database means that entries
have to be added and deleted frequently which is not effective.
Second, Golle’s scheme cannot provide privacy by change
of pseudonyms. If pseudonyms are allowed, the size of the
database increases drastically, because each node can have
several representations. Also, there might not be enough data
gathered for a node having a certain pseudonym.
Sybil attack [10] pose a great threat to VANETs. In a Sybil
attack, a malicious node creates several false identities and
poses as multiple vehicles. False information reported by such
a node will be convincing to the rest of the network, because
it appears that several entities agree with the information. This
can be very damaging where a false information might lead to
accidents. Since currently most malicious detection algorithms
and revocation schemes use majority or voting, Sybil attack
becomes a serious problem in VANETs.
There has been several papers to counteract Sybil attacks
in VANETs. In [42], the authors propose a scheme called
Privacy-preserving Detection of Abuses of Pseudonym P2DAP.
In P2DAP, there is a large pool of pseudonyms. There are two
hash functions Hc and Hf , which are called coarse grained
and fine grained hash functions respectively. Each pseudonym
has a fine grained hash value Hf (pi|kf ) and a coarse grained
hash value Hc(pi|kc). (pi is the pseudonym and kf and kc are
keys which are used from freshness). The fine grained hash
value of all the pseudonyms of a node are the same. Any two
fine grained hash value of pseudonym belonging to different
nodes is different. When a RSU (referred in the paper as road-
side boxes) receives a message, it notes the pseudonym that
was used to sign the message. If there are two pseudonyms
that hash to the same course grained value, then either they
are from the same vehicle (which has several entities) or from
different vehicles which hash to the same coarse grained value.
The RSU sends these values to the CA, which checks the fine
grained values to see if the same message was send by a node
with multiple entities or from several nodes. In this way Sybil
attack is detected. If more than one set of coarse grained values
are present, then all these are send to the CA, which verifies
if there is a Sybil attack. The scheme can be used to detect
collusion attacks of size less than some threshold, τ . Suppose
there are |Sc| < τ coarse grained values, then the RSU sends
the pseudonyms of the corresponding hash values to the CA,
which checks if they are from the same nodes.
The scheme assumes that the misbehaving vehicles are within
the reach of some RSU, which is not a valid assumption. Since
the scheme relies on collecting evidence from several nodes and
calculating all hash values, the detection can take as much as
200 seconds (as stated in the simulation results). This might
be too unrealistic in practical situation where prompt action
might be needed to prevent a crash. No action is taken against
compromised RSUs.
Xiao et al [39] which use signal strength to detect Sybil
attacks, suffers from the defect that a Sybil node might use
different signal strength to send different messages and will not
be detected. In [25], the RSU assigns certified time-stamps to
all vehicles that pass by it. When a message is sent out by a
node, a series of recent time stamp certificates are also send out.
It can be assumed that two or more nodes cannot pass the same
RSU at the same time for several times. So, if the same series
of time stamps are observed for two or more nodes, then it can
be assumed that the node is a Sybil node. A malicious node
might change the time stamps and send different time stamps
for different identities that it has faked, and avoid being detected
as a Sybil node.
Raya et al [31] proposed a scheme to detect and revoke mali-
cious nodes. Each node has several pseudonyms. Corresponding
to each pseudonym, there is one public/private key pair and a
certificate issued by the CA. To revoke a node, its certificates
are revoked. Their scheme consists of three components: (1)
Revocation of Trusted Component (RTC), (2) a Misbehavior
Detection System (MDS), and (3) a Local Revocation Protocol
by Voting Evaluators(LEAVE). The MDS system observes the
behavior of a node and compares it with the average behavior.
This is done using entropy. If pi is the probability that node i
is an attacker, then the entropy H =
∑N
i=1 pi log pi, (where
N is the number of nodes in the network) will be low if
few nodes behave differently and will be high if many nodes
behave differently. The K-means clustering algorithm [18] is
then used to find out the exact misbehaving node. Is there are
many malicious nodes, then the benign nodes will be convicted.
The LEAVE protocol evicts the certificates of a node, if the
number of accusations is above a certain threshold. Since the
nodes change their pseudonyms, there might not be enough
evidence against a malicious node if there are too few nodes in
its neighborhood. LEAVE requires an honest majority, meaning
that a benign node must be surrounded by more benign nodes
than selfish/malicious ones. So, the scheme fails when there are
too many misbehaving nodes around a benign node.
Moore et al [22] propose a scheme Stinger for faster exclusion
of misbehaving nodes. Stinger is faster than LEAVE, however,
LEAVE has a lower false positive rate. This means that it
revokes fewer benign nodes than Stinger. Stinger works as
follows: when a benign node G detects a bad node B, then
it broadcasts a stingG,B. All node near G blacklists both the
nodes B and G. Any message from B and G is disregarded.
However, they can still receive and forward messages. When the
nodes are within the reach of RSU, they are evicted altogether.
The disadvantage with Stinger is that many benign nodes can be
ignored to evict one bad node, as has already been pointed out
by the authors. If several bad nodes are present in the vicinity
of a benign node, then this method becomes ineffective.
A recent paper by Ghosh et al [14] detects the root-cause
of a misbehavior, in order to determine the future action to be
taken. They address post-crash notifications (PCN), where nodes
send false information about a PCN alert, after an accident has
taken place. The malicious node might either send a crash alert,
even if there is no crash and not send a crash alert, even if
there is a crash. This situation has been considered in [15]. The
analysis is based on the deviation of the actual trajectory from
the expected trajectory. For this reason, the trajectory of the
node sending out the alert is divided into predefined sample
points. The node’s location is sensed at these sample points.
The expected trajectory is calculated and compared against
the sensed trajectory. Depending upon the deviation from the
expected values, the type of misbehavior can be detected. There
are several issues to consider in this approach.
The change of pseudonyms during the estimation of the
deviations, might affect the results. If the pseudonyms are not
changed regularly, then privacy will be violated. More impor-
tantly, it is assumed that the nodes send correct locations. How-
ever, if the misbehaving nodes send their location in beacons,
then a malicious node might send false location information at
different sampling points and might go undetected.
IV. MODEL, DEFINITIONS AND NOTATIONS
In this section we present our model, definitions and notations
which we use throughout the rest of the paper.
A. Our model and assumptions
The network consists of a set N nodes of |N | = N nodes,
a set of RSUs, R, and a set of CAs, C. Vehicles are denoted
by ni (also called nodes), road side units (RSU) by Ri and
Certification Authorities (CA) Ci and a Master Authority MA.
We assume a one way traffic network, consisting of three lanes.
The MA is headed by the government of a State or Province.
Its authority is divided into several smaller regions each having
a local authority named CA. The CAs are government agencies
that maintain records of vehicles and their owners, and issue
unique identities as license plates and secret credentials like
pseudonyms, public/private keys and certificates. We use the
authentication scheme ECMV [38] which completely suits our
purpose. It has an hierarchical structure with several CAs. We
assume that the CAs to be trustworthy and has authority over
all vehicles registered locally.
We assume that RSUs are much more difficult to compro-
mise than the vehicles. Although RSUs are some- times in
isolated places, their hardware may present some tampering
proof capabilities, making it difficult for a regular human being
to compromise it. This is not true in the case of vehicles,
because its owner can drive to an expert just to have the vehicle
tampered.
Nodes misbehave by sending out false information, mainly
out of selfish motives like getting faster and easier access of
a road, getting credit card and other confidential information
about fellow nodes. Depending on their intention when sending
a false information, nodes can either be faulty (damaged), selfish
or malicious.
Since most of the undesirable behaviors will be caused due
to selfish motives, the classification of “good” node and “bad”
node is not so important as the distinction between correct
information and false information. We will be more concerned
with finding out if the message or alert signal generated by a
node is correct or false, than if the node is “good” or “bad”.
This can be termed as data-centric misbehavior detection. This
is different from entity-centric MDS, where nodes are either
classified as “good” or “bad”.
A node can send several types of messages when on the road.
We mainly deal with two types of messages.
1) Alert messages that ensure safety of vehicles on the road
[2]. These include:
a) Emergency Electronic Brake lights (EEBL),
b) Post Crash Notification (PCN),
c) Road Hazard Condition Notification (RHCN),
d) Road Feature Notification (RFN),
e) Stopped/Slow Vehicle Advisor (SVA),
f) Cooperative Collision Warning (CCW),
g) Cooperative Violation Warning (CVW),
h) Congested Road Notification (CRN),
i) Change of Lanes (CL),
j) Emergency Vehicle approaching (EVA).
2) Beacons which specify the location of the vehicles.
The alert messages are important to send safety information,
so that actions can be taken and accidents can be prevented.
EEBL alerts that a vehicle is decelerating rapidly, so that the
rear vehicles can prevent rear-end collisions. PCN alerts are
sent by vehicles warning other vehicles of an accident which
has already occurred. RHCN reports of road conditions like
“slippery road” or “ice” or unwanted debris on the road. SVA
alerts that a vehicle is moving slowly. RFN alerts of speed limits
near schools and hospitals or a sudden bend or steep slope.
CCW sends information about possible collisions that should
be avoided. CVW warns vehicles about possible violations of
traffic signals. CL notifies when a node is changing its lane.
These conditions are sent by nodes to nodes behind them.
The alert EVA might also be sent by nodes to other nodes
approaching from behind.
Alerts can be either observed or self generated. For example,
a vehicle might observe the road hazardous condition (PCN,
RHCN) or “school ahead” sign (RHN) or a slow moving vehicle
(SVA). Alerts can also be generated by the node itself when it
is decelerating rapidly (EEBL) or changing lanes (CL).
The CAs know the mapping between the pseudonym used by
each node and the unique id relating the pseudonym to the node.
If there is evidence from the RSU and other nodes, that the node
has misbehaved in a given situation, then this is noted and a
penalty is imposed in the form of a fine. This is very similar
to the general practice of imposing fines. The difference is that
the decision is no longer taken by an authority, like police and
speed cameras which might not be within reach when the event
has happened, but taken by fellow nodes or RSUs. The idea of
paying fines will decrease misbehaving from regular vehicles.
We will assume, that a faulty vehicle will be condemned in a
similar way. Therefore, it is up to the owner to maintain all
vehicle’s sensors at good conditions and always be aware of
what messages are being sent out. Each alert has an associated
amount of fine, depending the impact of misbehavior.
We define freshness interval as the time period during which
a message is fresh. This will vary for different types of alerts.
We denote it by FT .
B. Notations
The Table 1 gives the notations that we follow throughout the
rest of the paper. We use nodes and vehicles interchangeably.
Notation Meaning
N Number of nodes in the network
ni ith node
Ri ith RSU
Ci ith CA
T Type of alert
FT Period of freshness
pit Pseudonym of node i at time t
lit Location of ni at time t
Ei Event i for which an alert is generated
Li Location of the event Ei
MA Alert message
MR Replay message
MB Beacon
dist(lit, ljt) Distance between lit and ljt
TABLE I
TABLE OF NOTATIONS
V. PROPOSED MISBEHAVIOR DETECTION SCHEME
We first give a sketch of our approach and then work out the
details.
A. Sketch of our misbehavior detection system
Suppose a node nj having a pseudonym pjt sends out an
alert message MA at time t. Once a node ni receives some
alert signal from a node nj , it finds out from the alert message,
the type of alert and the location of the event Ex for which
the alert was generated. For example, the alert might be “There
is road block in location X”. In this case Ex would be “road
block” and Lx would be X . The type Tx is RHCN.
When ni later receives a beacon from node nj after an elapse
of time ∆t, it checks the current location of nj , and checks if it
can be a valid location for nj . For example if node nj first sends
a message “There is a road block in location X” and after time
∆t it is close to location X , then it implies two contradictory
statements and the alert message cannot be trusted. In this case
nj might send a false alert, nj sends to divert the traffic away
from the location X .
For this reason, each node maintains a list called the list of
invalid events, (LIE), for short. LIE contains a list of events
and corresponding invalid actions. For example, if there is an
emergency breaking, then the distance between the old and new
positions of nj cannot be more than 100 meters. In Table 2, we
present event and invalid action pair.
LIE will contain the information from first and third column
of the table. The change of lanes can be known from the position
information and interpreting it using GPS. d is the safe distance.
For example if a car is driving at 80kmph when it observes the
alert and then reduces its speed to 20kmph as a consequence
of the alert, then it will travel less about 100 meters in the next
two seconds. Thus the positions sent in the beacons will be less
than d =100 meters apart.
As soon as the node ni receives an alert message it transmits
the message. Later, after time tˆ, if ni realizes that the message
from node nj is incorrect, then it sends out the negation of
the alert message already sent. Node ni checks for a certain
time interval tˆ and if it does not receive any beacon during
this interval, then it assumes that the node nj has changed its
pseudonym. It also sends a message to the RSU, convicting nj
of sending false alert message. RSU checks with its own obser-
vation and sends a message to the CA stating the misbehavior
and the pseudonym of the node nj . CA knows the mapping
of the pseudonym with the original id and update its records
against node nj .
B. Misbehavior detection scheme in details
There is a pool of pseudonym P . A node ni is given a set of
pseudonyms Pi from this pool, such that
⋃N
i=1 Pi = P . Each
node ni has an id i and pseudonym pit ∈ Pi, at time t. Let τ
denote time. Each vehicle has an on board unit (OBU), which
is loaded with a public/private key pair, corresponding to each
pseudonym, by a CA.
We use the certificate management scheme, ECMV of Wasef
et al [38]. There is a master authority (MA) and several CAs.
The MA generates public/private key pairs and two secret
certificate signing keys, for each CA. The MA also generates
public keys for verifying the certificates of RSUs and nodes.
Each CA uses the certificate signing keys to sign a certificate
set of each RSU. The certificates in a set are shared among all
the RSUs in the set. The other secret key is used to generate a
partial signing key for each RSU. Each RSU uses this partial
signing key to generate certificates for each node within its
range. Public keys can be used by CAs, RSUs or nodes to verify
the certificates of RSUs and nodes. ECMV has certificate update
algorithm which suits our purpose fully. For more details on the
ECMV scheme one can refer to [38].
An event Ex can be for example like:
1) Emergency breaking,
2) Observation of unwanted debris on road or hazardous road
conditions like “ice”, “slippery road” etc,
3) Observation of “Drive slow” sign in areas like school or
hospitals or steep slope,
4) Crash Notification,
5) Approaching emergency vehicles.
A list of emergency alerts has been discussed in IV-A. We
denote the set of alerts by T . The set of locations is given
by L. M denotes the message space.
An alert message, denoted by MA ∈ M is a five tuple
MA = (pit, T, Lj, t, lit),
where, pit ∈ Pi is the pseudonym of the node ni who generated
the alert at time t ∈ τ ,
T ∈ T is the type of alert, which can be one of the alerts which
have already discussed,
Lj ∈ L is the location of the event Ej for which the alert was
generated,
t ∈ τ is the time at which the alert message had been sent,
lit ∈ L is the location of the node ni which generated the alert
at time t.
A node that receives an alert message from a neighboring
node, relays it to other nodes and RSUs in its vicinity.
A relay alert, denoted by MR is a tuple,
TABLE II
EVENTS AND INVALID ACTIONS
Event Expected action Invalid Action
EEBL Car must slow down D > d meters
PCN Car stops/Changes Lane D > d meters and No Lane Change
RHCN Car stops/ Changes rout D > d meters and Same Route
RFN Decrease speed D > d meters
SVA Change lane/decrease speed D > d meters and Same Lane
CCW Slow down D > d meters
CVW Slow down D > d meters
CL Lane change Same Lane
EVA Change Lane/slow down D > d meters and Same Lane as Vehicle
Where D ≡ dist(ljt1 , ljt3 ). The first and third columns are used to build LIE.
MR = (pit, t,MA),
where, pit ∈ Pi is the pseudonym of the node ni who sends
the relay alert, t ∈ τ is the time at which MR was sent and
MA ∈M is the alert message that it is relaying.
A beacon sent by a node is denoted by B and is a three tuple
MB = (pit, t, lit),
where, pi ∈ Pi is the pseudonym of the node, t ∈ τ is the time
at which the beacon was sent, and lit ∈ L is the location of the
node.
Suppose a node ni, having a pseudonym pit2 at time t2
receives an alert message MA, from a node nj (with pseudonym
pjt1 ), it first checks if it has a valid signature. This can be done
by ECMV [38]. If the node pjt1 has a valid signature, then ni
notes the time t1 from the message MA = (pjt1 , T, Lx, t1, ljt1).
Lx is the location of the event for which the alert was generated.
In some cases, for example lane change information it is
possible that Lx = ljt1 .
We define a threshold time FT after which a message
becomes stale. FT is also known as period of freshness. If
t2−t1 > FT , then it means that nj had sent it long back and has
become stale. So ni discards the message MA. If the message
is fresh then the position of the event Lx and the location of
node ljt1 is noted. If the positions are contradictory, then no
action is taken for the alert and the message is discarded.
The positions are contradictory, if the order of location is
anything other than ni − nj − Ex or Ex − nj − ni. The first
condition arises when the event has occurred in front of nj and
nj is sending a message to the node ni behind it. The second
condition arises when the event has occurred behind nj and
nj is sending a message to the node ni, which is in front of
it. The first condition arises when there is an accident at E
and emergency breaking alert is raised by nj , or there is road
hazard like water or ice on road. The second order arises if there
is an emergency vehicle approaching from behind. So node nj
reports to ni (who is in front of it) to make space for the vehicle
approaching from behind.
If the positions are correct, then the node ni considers the
alert. We will see in the next section, how to detect incorrect
location information. It checks the alert type and prepares to
take action against it. The node ni might receive more that one
alert messages from different nodes. We do not, however make
a decision on the validity of the alert based on the number
of vehicles that report the alert, because we do not rely on
thresholds. This is where our scheme differs from other VANET
MDS. For this reason, Sybil attack is not effective against our
scheme.
After receiving an alert message, the node ni waits for
beacons from nj for a time period of tˆ. It verifies the position
of the node nj from all the beacons it receives during this time
period. When the node ni receives beacon message from the
nodes nj , it checks the position Lx in the alert message and
the position ljt3 of the beacon message MB = (pjt3 , t3, ljt3).
It checks the LIE to see if the alert type contradicts with the
position. If it does, then ni sends out an alert message which
is the negation of the previous message. It also reports the
nearest RSU and convicts node nj for sending false message.
If node ni does not receive any beacon from nj in time tˆ after
receiving an alert message from nj , then it assumes that the
pseudonym has changed. Changing pseudonym within a time tˆ
is considered to be a misbehavior and so ni reports the RSU
that nj is misbehaving.
The RSU upon receiving such conviction messages, compares
with its own observation and reports to the CA the pseudonym
of the misbehaving node along with the reason for accusing
it. Only the CA can match the pseudonym with the original
identity of the node. The CA then issues negative points to the
node, which has to pay it as a fine, depending on the number
of negative points received. Our assumptions are based on the
fact that, any misbehaving node does so, mainly due to selfish
reasons and is most likely not to send false message all the
time, but only when needed. A large number of misbehaviors
can be interpreted as a malicious motive and such nodes can be
revoked off their certificates and other secret credentials using
the revocation scheme in PASS [37].
C. How to detect incorrect location information
In the previous section, we assumed that the location infor-
mation send in the alert message or in the beacons is correct.
However, a clever malicious node will also send incorrect
location information, along with the false alert message. In this
section we see, how to detect incorrect location information.
Studder et al [35] have presented how to detect nodes moving
in a straight line and transmitting false location information.
The decision to convict a node depends on the number of votes
cast against it. If a node is surrounded by many corrupt nodes,
then a node cannot be convicted. The authors also show that
if the first two nodes in the straight line (convoy) send false
messages, then they cannot be detected. In our scheme it is
very likely that the first node transmits a false alert or beacon
with wrong position information. So we cannot use the limited
incorrect location detection approach of Studder et al.
Suppose a node nj sends a beacon at time t1, then suppose
ni (in communication range of nj) receives the message at time
t2. Then t2 is given by
t2 = t1 +
dist(lit2 , ljt1)
c
(1)
where c is the speed of light. Suppose, node nj wants to fake
its location as l′jt1 , so it sends a beacon with the information
(pjt1 , t1, l
′
jt1
). Node ni receives it at time t2. Node ni finds out
that nj is lying because Eq(1) does not hold. To convince ni,
that it is not lying, node nj should also change the time stamp
when the beacon is sent. The time t′
1
at which he must send
the message, so that nj receives it at t2, is given by
t2 = t
′
1 +
dist(lit2 , l
′
jt1
)
c
(2)
So,
t′1 = t1 +
dist(lit2 , ljt1)
c
−
dist(lit2 , l
′
jt1
)
c
(3)
So node nj sends a beacon (pjt1 , t′1, l′jt1) to convince ni that
it is sending the correct message. However, since node nj does
not know the distance between itself and the node ni accurately,
it cannot accurately calculate t′1. So, when node ni observes
the time stamp t1 and the false location l′jt1 , then any node
can calculate the expected position and verify it according to
equation (1).
There is an exception to the above condition. We refer to
the Fig 2. In case the node sends a location information l′jt3 at
time t3, when its current location is ljt3 , then ni will not be
able to make out that node nj is lying because it is equidistant
from both the locations l′jt3 and ljt3 . Similar is the case for all
vehicles which lie on the line Z . However, if there is another
node nr (with pseudonym prt3 , as shown), then it will be able
to make out that nj is lying about its position. If the RSU is
not on Z , then it is able to understand that nj is lying and it
will take action against it. In the rare case if the RSU is also
on the line Z , it cannot predict correctly based on one node’s
correct observation.
We will include this observation in the MDS of previous
section. On receiving the message MA, a node nj first checks
the authenticity of the message using ECMV [38]. If the
message is not stale (t2 − t1 < FT , Step 5) and the order
of the vehicles is either ni−nj−Ex or Ex−nj−ni (checked
by the condition dist(ljt1 , lit2) < dist(lit2,Lx)), then node ni
Fig. 2. Exception when many cars are equidistant from the true and correct
positions of nj
waits for beacons from nj . It checks this for time tˆ. Suppose
ni receives a beacon message MB = (pjt3 , t3, ljt3 ) from nj at
time t3. ni first checks the validity of the location using Eq(1).
It then looks up in LIE for event Ex. If the action is invalid,
then it reports misbehavior and broadcast the negation of the
message. If action is correct, then it broadcasts the message
MB. The variable count, keeps track of the number of beacons
received during the interval tˆ. If no beacon is received, then it
implies that the node nj has changed its pseudonym and this is
reported and misbehavior reported.
We present the MDS algorithm below.
The procedure check action function takes the inputs LIE, T ,
t1, t3, ljt1 , ljt3 and outputs 0 or 1 depending on bad or good
behavior. First it finds out the event Ex that cause the alert.
Then it looks up in the table LIE to check if the conditions
corresponding to Ex if the conditions hold. If the conditions
match r is set to 0, meaning that there is a misbehavior. If the
conditions in the table LIE do not match, then r = 1.
The function report misbehavior takes as input the
pseudonym of the reporting node and the false alert message
and send it to the RSU. Message negation creates the negation
of the message. For example if the alert was “There is ice on
rout X”, then the negation of the message is “There is no ice
on rout X”. If node ni retransmits a false message, then it will
be found in either of the two ways:
1) By node ni (if within communication range) by observing
that MR does not contain the message MA that it had sent.
2) By other nodes which receive MR and subsequent loca-
tion information from beacons of ni. They will find out if
node ni is malicious by an algorithm similar to Algorithm
1.
However it is possible that node ni is falsely accusing node
nj . In this case the RSU will reject the accusation and convict
ni. The other cars will be warned that ni is lying.
Algorithm 1 MDS algorithm operated by a node ni
Input: Alert message MA, beacons MB , Table LIE
Output: ”Valid Alert” or ”Invalid
Alert”
1: Tag =1, count = 0
2: Node ni receives MA = (pjt1 , T, Lx, t1, ljt1) at time t2
3: Check authenticity of MA using ECMV
4: if MA is authentic and Eq(1) holds then
5: if (t1 < t2 and t2 − t1 < FT ) and (dist(ljt1 , lit2) <
dist(lit2,Lx)) then
6: while t < t2 + tˆ do
7: while ni receives beacon from nj do
8: Node ni receives MB = (pjt3 , t3, ljt3) at time t4
9: count = count +1
10: if t3 and t4 satisfy equation(1) then
11: Look up in LIE for type T of event Ex
12: r = check action function(LIE,T , t1, t3, ljt1 ,
ljt3 )
13: Tag = 0
14: if r = 1 then
15: Broadcast MR = (pit5 , t5,MA)
16: Take action against Ex
17: Print “Valid Alert”
18: else
19: M ′A = Message negation(MA) {creates the
negation of the message}
20: Broadcast MR = (pit5 , t5,M ′A)
21: Tag = 1
22: end if
23: else
24: Tag = 1
25: end if
26: end while
27: end while
28: if Count =0 then
29: “Pseudonym Change”
30: Tag = 1
31: end if
32: else
33: Tag = 1
34: end if
35: else
36: Tag = 1
37: end if
38: if Tag = 1 then
39: report misbehavior(pit5,MA)
40: Discard MA
41: Print “Invalid Alert”
42: end if
Since the results are also verified by the RSU before sending
to the CA, even if the observing vehicles are misbehaving,
the misbehavior can be detected. The above approach does not
require any voting or majority, so a Sybil attack does not have
any effect in misbehavior detection.
D. How to deal with compromised RSUs
RSUs are prone to be compromised. However, compromising
RSU is much difficult that compromising nodes. Compromised
RSUs can either transmit false messages or convict benign
nodes. A RSU which transmits false messages can be noticed
by other nodes, which reports it to the next RSU. If it receives a
large number of such reports over a long time, then the RSU is
considered to be compromised If benign nodes are convicted,
they are imposed fines by the CA. If the message sent by a
node has been modified by the RSU, then the convicted node
can prove it using its signature. We note here that in ECMV
certificates are not created by the RSUs. So RSUs cannot fake
the signature on the messages, sent by the nodes. The nodes
can then prove their message authenticity, using the signatures
on the messages.
Once it is known that an RSU has been compromised, its
certificate is revoked using the techniques in ECMV scheme.
We note that the RSUs much fewer in number, compared to the
nodes. So broadcasting a CRL for RSUs will not be expensive.
If the number of misbehaviors observed for a node is very high,
then it is assumed that the node is malicious and removed from
the network altogether.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON
We compare our scheme with existing MDS schemes in
Table 3. Our scheme has all the desirable properties like
location privacy, ability to detect false location information and
immunity against Sybil attacks.
In our scheme we have used ECMV [38] for authentication
which fits into the hierarchical structure of our network. The
transmission delay is only 6.47ms (as stated in [38]). The time
taken for certificate verification is 14.7ms and for signature
verification is 5.1ms. (3Tpar +2Tmul and 2Tpar +Tmul where
Tpar = 4.5ms and Tmul = 0.6ms).
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Fig. 3. Comparison of communication overhead required for to send the CRL
Scheme Location Privacy False Location Info. Immune to Sybil Attacks
LEAVE [31] Yes Yes No
Golle et al [16] No Yes No
Zhou et al [42] No No Yes
Ghosh et al [14] No No No
Ours Yes Yes Yes
TABLE III
COMPARISON WITH OTHER MISBEHAVIOR DETECTION SCHEMES
According to our algorithm, there is no extra communication
overhead for revocation list, because only the identity of the
misbehaving node is sent to the nearest RSU. The other nodes
need not check any CRL list before then send their message. The
message transmitted is simply the negation of the transmitted
message which involves the same cost. Since CRL is not
needed in our scheme, communication overhead is greatly
reduced as compared to other schemes. In Fig 3, we show
the communication overhead incurred by different schemes. We
consider the Hybrid scheme by Calandriello et al [7], ECMV
scheme [38], PASS [37] and LEAVE [31]. We see that LEAVE
incurs a high communication overhead, compared with [7], [38]
and [37].
VII. LIMITATIONS AND COUNTERMEASURES: FUTURE
COURSE OF ACTION
In this section we discuss certain limitations our scheme and
provide possible solutions to the problems.
A. Limitations
Our scheme is based on calculating distance between nodes,
in order to detect false location information. We have already
shown one condition (Fig 2), where a node nj will not be
detected to be misbehaving. Another situation where our scheme
will fail to give correct results is when a node takes a U-
turn. In such a situation, it might seem that a node is giving
false location information, because its location is far behind the
expected location. It might seem that the vehicle has moved
backwards, which means its location information is faulty. The
other situation is when a node is moving on a flyover with loops,
the actual distance might be quite different from the Euclidean
distance dist(u, v). We leave it as an open problem.
Another limitation is when nodes are moving in a group. One
node might aid the other by sending a wrong alert information.
Suppose two nodes ni and nj are moving together as a group.
Node ni should take a right turn and node nj is supposed to go
left. Node ni takes the right turn as per its requirement. Node
nj can then aid node ni by sending an alert like “hazardous
condition on right road” and take the left one as desired.
Nodes behind nj notice the alert and also the subsequent
beacon messages and conclude that the alert sent by nj is
correct, following our algorithm. Misbehavior of node nj will
go undetected. They might then take the straight road and
benefit node ni. Such issues are left as future work.
Another limitation is that, since each node retransmits the
alert message to the others, the same alert message will be
retransmitted by several nodes, using more bandwidth than
necessary. How to efficiently handle this problem is left as a
future work.
B. Incentivizing nodes
We assume that nodes which sense or receive alerts, immedi-
ately transmit them to other nodes. However transmitting such
alerts leads to power consumption. So, it is natural to ask why
would a node be motivated to send out such alerts, when its only
goal is to save itself. One way to overcome this problem is to
give incentives to nodes which co-operate in transmitting useful
messages. So that, every transmitted message MA and MR is
noted. The node pjt is given an incentive, in terms of positive
points is it sends out correct information and given negative
points, if it sends out wrong information. The points can be
suitably adjusted as providing free service for points above a
certain threshold.
C. Change of direction
We have assumed that nodes move in the same direction.
However, a node moving in the opposite direction can send
out false alert message. Such nodes might not do so for selfish
reason, but have malicious intentions. We leave this problem
open for future research.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have discussed the limitations of existing misbehavior
detection schemes in VANETs and proposed a new scheme.
We introduce the concept of data-centric MDS, where we are
more interested in finding out false information than classifying
nodes as “good” and “bad”. The main reason for this is that
nodes misbehave mainly because of selfish reasons and need not
be classified as “good” or “bad” nodes. Our scheme provides
location privacy, by the use of pseudonyms. Any node can detect
false alert information, by observing the location of the node
after issuing an alert. There is no need of voting and majority
decisions. This makes our scheme resilient to Sybil attacks. So
we do not revoke nodes completely, but impose fines depending
false message sent out. We point our some limitations of our
scheme and discuss several directions for future work.
REFERENCES
[1] Tiranuch Anantvalee and Jie Wu. Wireless/Mobile Network Security,
chapter : A Survey on Intrusion Detection in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks.
Springer-Verlag, 2008.
[2] Fan Bai, Hariharan Krishnan, Varsha Sadekar, Gavin Holl, and Tamer
Elbatt. Towards characterizing and classifying communication-based
automotive applications from a wireless networking perspective. In In
Proceedings of IEEE Workshop on Automotive Networking and Applica-
tions (AutoNet), 2006.
[3] Igor Bilogrevic, Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, Maxim Raya, and Jean-
Pierre Hubaux. Optimal revocations in ephemeral networks: A game-
theoretic framework. In WiOpt, pages 21–30. IEEE, 2010.
[4] Subir Biswas, Md. Mahbubul Haque, and Jelena V. Misic. Privacy and
anonymity in vanets: A contemporary study. Ad Hoc & Sensor Wireless
Networks, 10(2-3):177–192, 2010.
[5] Dan Boneh, Xavier Boyen, and Hovav Shacham. Short group signatures.
In Matthew K. Franklin, editor, CRYPTO, volume 3152 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 41–55. Springer, 2004.
[6] Levente Buttya´n, Tama´s Holczer, and Istva´n Vajda. On the effectiveness
of changing pseudonyms to provide location privacy in vanets. In Frank
Stajano, Catherine Meadows, Srdjan Capkun, and Tyler Moore, editors,
ESAS, volume 4572 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 129–
141. Springer, 2007.
[7] Giorgio Calandriello, Panos Papadimitratos, Jean-Pierre Hubaux, and
Antonio Lioy. Efficient and robust pseudonymous authentication in vanet.
In Wieland Holfelder, Paolo Santi, Yih-Chun Hu, and Jean-Pierre Hubaux,
editors, Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks, pages 19–28. ACM, 2007.
[8] David Chaum and Euge`ne van Heyst. Group signatures. In EUROCRYPT,
pages 257–265, 1991.
[9] Jolyon Clulow and Tyler Moore. Suicide for the common good: a new
strategy for credential revocation in self-organizing systems. Operating
Systems Review, 40(3):18–21, 2006.
[10] John R. Douceur. The sybil attack. In Peter Druschel, M. Frans Kaashoek,
and Antony I. T. Rowstron, editors, IPTPS, volume 2429 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 251–260. Springer, 2002.
[11] Julien Freudiger, Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, Jean-Yves Le Boudec,
and Jean-Pierre Hubaux. On the age of pseudonyms in mobile ad hoc
networks. In INFOCOM, pages 1577–1585. IEEE, 2010.
[12] Julien Freudiger, Maxim Raya, Mrk Felegyhazi, Panos Papadimitratos, and
Jean-Pierre Hubeax. Mix-zones for location privacy in vehicular networks.
In Proceedings of WiN-ITS, 2007.
[13] Saurabh Ganeriwal and Mani B. Srivastava. Reputation-based framework
for high integrity sensor networks. In Sanjeev Setia and Vipin Swarup,
editors, SASN, pages 66–77. ACM, 2004.
[14] Mainak Ghosh, Anitha Varghese, Arobinda Gupta, Arzad Alam Kherani,
and Skanda N. Muthaiah. Detecting misbehaviors in vanet with integrated
root-cause analysis. Ad Hoc Networks, 8(7):778–790, 2010.
[15] Mainak Ghosh, Anitha Varghese, Arzad Alam Kherani, and Arobinda
Gupta. Distributed misbehavior detection in vanets. In WCNC, pages
2909–2914, 2009.
[16] Philippe Golle, Daniel H. Greene, and Jessica Staddon. Detecting and
correcting malicious data in vanets. In Kenneth P. Laberteaux, Raja
Sengupta, Chen-Nee Chuah, and Daniel Jiang, editors, Vehicular Ad Hoc
Networks, pages 29–37. ACM, 2004.
[17] Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Srdjan Capkun, and Jun Luo. The security and
privacy of smart vehicles. IEEE Security & Privacy, 2(3):49–55, 2004.
[18] Anil K. Jain, M. Narasimha Murty, and Patrick J. Flynn. Data clustering:
A review. ACM Comput. Surv., 31(3):264–323, 1999.
[19] F. Kargl, P. Papadimitratos, L. Buttyan, M. Mter, E. Schoch, B. Wieder-
sheim, T. v. Thong, G. Cal, A. Held, A. Kung, and J. p. Hubaux.
Secure vehicular communication systems: Implementation, performance,
and research challenges. In In IEEE Wireless Communication Magazine,
pages 110–118, 2008.
[20] Kenneth P. Laberteaux, Jason J. Haas, and Yih-Chun Hu. Security
certificate revocation list distribution for vanet. In Varsha K. Sadekar,
Paolo Santi, Yih-Chun Hu, and Martin Mauve, editors, Vehicular Ad Hoc
Networks, pages 88–89. ACM, 2008.
[21] Bisheng Liu, Jerry T. Chiang, , and Yih-Chun Hu. Limits on revocation in
vanets. In Pre-proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Applied
Cryptography and Network Security (ACNS 2010), pages 38–52, 2010.
[22] Tyler Moore, Maxim Raya, Jolyon Clulow, Panagiotis Papadimitratos,
Ross Anderson, and Jean-Pierre Hubaux. Fast exclusion of errant devices
from vehicular networks. In SECON, pages 135–143. IEEE, 2008.
[23] P. Papadimitratos, L. Buttyan, T. Holczer, E. Schoch, J. Freudiger,
M. Raya, Z. Ma, F. Kargl, A. Kung, and J. p. Hubaux. Secure vehicular
communication systems: design and architecture. In In IEEE Wireless
Communication Magazine, pages 100–109, 2008.
[24] Panagiotis Papadimitratos, Ghita Mezzour, and Jean-Pierre Hubaux. Cer-
tificate revocation list distribution in vehicular communication systems. In
Varsha K. Sadekar, Paolo Santi, Yih-Chun Hu, and Martin Mauve, editors,
Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks, pages 86–87. ACM, 2008.
[25] Soyoung Park, Baber Aslam, Damla Turgut, and Cliff C. Zou. Defense
against sybil attack in vehicular ad hoc network based on roadside unit
support. In MILCOM, pages 1–7, 2009.
[26] Bryan Parno and Adrian Perrig. Challenges in security vehicular networks.
In HotNets-IV, 2005.
[27] Svetlana Radosavac, John S. Baras, and Iordanis Koutsopoulos. A frame-
work for mac protocol misbehavior detection in wireless networks. In
Markus Jakobsson and Radha Poovendran, editors, Workshop on Wireless
Security, pages 33–42. ACM, 2005.
[28] Maxim Raya. Data-Centric Trust in Ephemeral Networks. Ph D Thesis.
EPFL, Lausanne, 2009.
[29] Maxim Raya and Jean-Pierre Hubaux. Securing vehicular ad hoc net-
works. Journal of Computer Security, 15(1):39–68, 2007.
[30] Maxim Raya, Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, Ma´rk Fe´legyha´zi, and Jean-
Pierre Hubaux. Revocation games in ephemeral networks. In Peng Ning,
Paul F. Syverson, and Somesh Jha, editors, ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, pages 199–210. ACM, 2008.
[31] Maxim Raya, Panagiotis Papadimitratos, Imad Aad, Daniel Jungels, and
Jean-Pierre Hubaux. Eviction of misbehaving and faulty nodes in
vehicular networks. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications,
25(8):1557–1568, 2007.
[32] Steffen Reidt, Mudhakar Srivatsa, and Shane Balfe. The fable of the bees:
incentivizing robust revocation decision making in ad hoc networks. In
Ehab Al-Shaer, Somesh Jha, and Angelos D. Keromytis, editors, ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 291–302.
ACM, 2009.
[33] Krishna Sampigethaya, Leping Huang, Mingyan Li, Radha Poovendran,
Kanta Matsuura, and Kaoru Sezaki. Caravan: Providing location privacy
for vanet. In Proc. of the Workshop on Embedded Security in Cars
(ESCAR), 2005.
[34] Krishna Sampigethaya, Mingyan Li, Leping Huang, and Radha Pooven-
dran. Amoeba: Robust location privacy scheme for vanet. IEEE Journal
on Selected Areas in Communications, 25(8):1569–1589, 2007.
[35] Ahren Studer, Mark Luk, and Adrian Perrig. Efficient mechanisms to
provide convoy member and vehicle sequence authentication in vanets. In
SecureComm, pages 422–432, 2007.
[36] Ahren Studer, Elaine Shi, Fan Bai, , and Adrian Perrig. Efficient
mechanisms to provide convoy tacking together efficient authentication
revocation, and privacy in vanets. In SECON 2009, pages 1–9, 2009.
[37] Yipin Sun, Rongxing Lu, Xiaodong Lin, Xuemin Shen, and Jinshu Su.
An efficient pseudonymous authentication scheme with strong privacy
preservation for vehicular communications. IEEE Trans. on Vehicular
Technology, 59(7):3589–3603, 2010.
[38] Albert Wasef, Yixin Jiang, and Xuemin Shen. Ecmv: Efficient certificate
management scheme for vehicular networks. In GLOBECOM, pages 639–
643. IEEE, 2008.
[39] Bin Xiao, Bo Yu, and Chuanshan Gao. Detection and localization of sybil
nodes in vanets. In Proceedings of the 2006 workshop on Dependability
issues in wireless ad hoc networks and sensor networks, pages 1–8, 2006.
[40] Hao Yang, J. Shu, Xiaoqiao Meng, and Songwu Lu. Scan: self-organized
network-layer security in mobile ad hoc networks. IEEE Journal on
Selected Areas in Communications, 24(2):261–273, 2006.
[41] Qing Zhang, Ting Yu, and Peng Ning. A framework for identifying
compromised nodes in wireless sensor networks. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst.
Secur., 11(3), 2008.
[42] Tong Zhou, Romit Roy Choudhury, Peng Ning, and Krishnendu
Chakrabarty. Privacy-preserving detection of sybil attacks in vehicular
ad hoc networks. In MobiQuitous, pages 1–8. IEEE, 2007.
